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In recent years, it has been discovered that it may not
be wise to do extensive preventive maintenance on a system.
The system may actually tend to fail more often than if such
maintenance was eliminated. The Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) program identifies only those preventive
maintenance tasks which will provide increased reliability
while, at the same time, reducing expenditures. The S-3A is
a shipboard based anti-submarine warfare aircraft and was
built by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for the United States
Navy. The S-3A entered service in the mid 1970 's, well
before the current refinements to the RCM program had been
developed. As a consequence, its maintenance plan did not
embody all of the changes that today's RCM program includes,
A complete RCM analysis has never been performed on the S-3A
aircraft because excessive amounts of resources would be
required. This thesis shows where RCM can be selectively
applied to the existing S-3A maintenance programs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE EVOLUTION OF MAINTENANCE TASK DEVELOPMENT
Early on in aviation, maintenance programs were based on
the concept that periodic overhauls would increase
reliability. This philosophy of trying to make the
equipment like "new" to ensure operational safety continued
well past World War II. However, tests conducted by the
airlines in the mid 1960s suggested a new concept in
preventive maintenance; that less was better.
Representitives of the airlines formed a maintenance
steering group (MSG) to provide guidelines for reducing the
amount of preventive maintenance. The results culminated
with a handbook titled, "Maintenance Evaluation and Program
Development " (Ref 1) . Known as MSG-1, it was in this
initial stage that decision logic and procedures were first
introduced for establishing a conservative preventive
maintenance program. Further development of this
maintenance philosophy by the Air Transport Association in
1970 lead to MSG-2 which provided a logical procedure for
analyzing a piece of equipment in terms of its maintenance
priority to the overall system. The final development, MSG-
3, occurred when the Department of Defense contracted with
United Airlines to have F. Stanley Nowlan and Howard F. Heap
write a comprehensive report on what was to become known as
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) . The results of this
effort, provided the methodology for analyzing each
maintenance requirement and objectively justifing a
preferred maintenance task. This program was later
incorporated in MIL-HDBK-266 (AS)
.
This evolution of MSG philosophy has provided the
analyst and engineer with a logical and detailed process by
which to thoroughly analyze and evaluate a maintenance
program and its associated maintenance tasks.
B. OBJECTIVE
The S-3A is a shipboard based anti-submarine warfare
aircraft and was built by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for
the United States Navy. The S-3A entered service in the
mid 1970 's, well before the RCM concept was developed.
Subsequently, the S-3A maintenance plan was developed
utilizing MSG-2 philosophy and did not embody the changes
that RCM brought about. A complete RCM analysis has never
been performed on the S-3A aircraft nor is it recommended.
Excessive amounts of resources would precluded such an
undertaking. But by applying RCM selectively to existing S-
3a maintenance programs, cost savings can and will be
realized. The logic provided by the RCM program identifies
only those preventive maintenance tasks which provide
increased reliability while, at the same time, reducing
expenditures. The objective of this thesis is to identify
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how RCM analysis could benefit the S-3A maintenance program.
It is also hoped that this thesis will provide any
person not familiar with the RCM philosophy with a thorough
understanding of the terminology and analytical techniques
associated with RCM.
C. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis will concentrate on the S-3A
aircraft and will examine only those airframe aspects of the
S-3A aircraft where RCM would be most beneficial to the S-
BA's maintenance program.
D. PREVIEW
Chapter II considers the major events in the development
of RCM from the initial inception of MSG-1 through MSG-3.
Terms and concepts associated with Reliability Centered
Maintenance are also discussed. Chapter III reviews the
S-3A's maintenance plan based on MSG-2 philosophy. It shows
how maintenance tasks were developed. Chapter IV considers
the differences between MSG-2 and MSG-3 maintenance
philosophies. It also establishes how RCM can enhance the
S-3A maintenance program. Chapter V presents a summary,
conclusions and recommendations.
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II. HISTORY QF RELIABILITY CENTERED MAINTENANCE
A. EARLY MAINTENANCE THEORY
Early pioneers in aviation operated under the assumption
that if a periodic scheduled maintenance program was
established it would ensure reliability and operational
safety. However, by the late 50's, actual data was
contradicting many of the basic assumptions of traditional
maintenance practice.
Early maintenance theory was based on an intuitive
belief that because mechanical parts wear out the
reliability of the equipment is directly related to
operating age (Ref. 2:p. 2). It followed that if one
has the capability of making the equipment like "new" it
would, in turn, ensure the original reliability. A
problem still existed, however, in determining the
interval of inspection and repair so that age limit criteria
that was determined by engineering analysis would not be
exceeded. It became more and more obvious that the concept
of overhauling complicated equipment was of questionable
benefit, both economically and from a safety and reliability
standpoint (Ref 3: p. 19). Actual analysis of failure-"
data suggested that the overhaul policies were
ineffective in controlling failure rates and that failure
rates actually increased after overhauls.
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Our inability to predict failure rates can be partially
explained- by analyzing Figure 1. Also known as the "bathtub
curve", it demonstrates how an aircraft that has undergone a
complete overhaul could experience an initial increase in
failures during the burn-in period. This trend can not be
attributed to an insufficient inspection interval or
overhauls that were not thoroughly performed. After this
"burn in" period, the liklehood of failure remained fairly
constant for most of an aircraft's useful life. It is near
the end of this phase that we become concerned with










Figure 1. Failure as a Function of Flight Hours
600
If we concentrate on the flat part of the curve it is
still possible to have high failure rates. Because of this,
a task force consisting of representatives from the FAA,
13
airlines and aircraft manufacturers was formed to try and
reduce the high rates. The work of the group led to an
FAA/industry reliability program, issued November 1, 1961.
The introduction to that program stated:
The development of this program is towards the control of
reliability through an analysis of the factors that affect
reliability and provide a system of actions to improve low
reliability levels when they exist. ... In the past, a
great deal of emphasis has been placed on the control of
overhaul periods to provide a satisfactory level of
reliability. After careful study, the Committee is convinced
that reliability and overhaul time control are not
necessarily directly associated topics; therefore, these
subjects are dealt with separately.
This approach was a direct challenge to the traditional
concept that the length of the interval between successive
overhauls of an item was an important factor in its failure
rate (Ref 2: p. 4). Up until this point, reliability was
assumed if the aircraft was periodically overhauled.
However, historical data proved otherwise.
B. MSG-1
Under the force of economic pressures to further
reduce maintenance costs, while maintaining sufficiently
high levels of reliability and safety, specialists wanted to
define a generally applicable approach to the design of
maintenance programs. In 1967, a joint effort, again
between the FAA, airlines and aircraft manufacturers,
lead to the formation of a maintenance steering group (MSG)
which published a document titled Handbook; Maintenance
Evaluation and Program Development (Ref 1). This
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handbook, more commonly known as MSG-1, was used by special
teams of industry and FAA personnel to develop the initial
maintenance program for the Boeing 747. As described by the
FAA, these teams*
.sorted out the potential maintenance tasks and then
evaluated them to determine which must be done for operating
safety or essential hidden function protection. The
remaining potential tasks were evaluated to determine
whether they were economically useful. These procedures
provide a systematic review of the aircraft design so that,
in the absence of real experience, the best maintenance
process can be utilized for each component and system.
C. MSG-2
Further development of the decision logic and
procedures resulted in the 1970 publication of MSG-
2, Air line/Manufacture Maintenance Program Planning Document,
(Ref 4) . MSG-2 logic was used to develop the maintenance
program for the Lockheed L-1011, Douglas DC-10, and was
first applied to Naval aircraft in 1972 on the P-3A, S-3A
and F-4J. The main thrust of MSG-2 was to increase both
reliability and safety while, at the same time, reducing
costs associated with maintainability.
The Navy's version of MSG-2 was incorporated into a
Naval Air System Command document, NAVAIR 00-25-400 (Ref 5).
As stated previously, this manual was the basis by which the
Navy revised the prevent it ive maintenance requirements of
the P-3A, S-3A and F-4J. However, as the predecessor to the
*FAA Certification Procedures, May 19, 1972 Par. 3036
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RCM (Reliability Centered Maintenance) analysis, MSG-2 was
utilized to develop prior-to-service programs such as the
maintenance plan and phased maintenance programs. No
attempt was made to incorporate historical data that could
justify modification of the maintenance program after the
aircraft became operational.
D. MSG-3
The Department of Defense contracted with United Air
Lines, Inc. to write an extensive report on "Reliability
Centered Maintenance" (RCM) in an attempt to find an
approach which could incorporate actual maintenance history.
Their report, (Ref 1) clarified the analysis process and
provided greater detail in defining the scope and philosophy
of the program.
Further refinement of the RCM concept by commercial
aviation personnel lead to the development of MSG-3 (Ref 6)
in 1980 and improved the analysis procedures for the
aircraft structures. MIL-HDBK-266 (Ref 8) applied the MSG-3
philosophy to Naval aircraft in 1981 and has recently been
superceded by MIL-STD-2173 (Ref 7) in January of 1986. The
standard provides the principles of RCM and how it should be
applied to all Naval aircraft, weapon systems, and support
equipment. However, to date, not all Naval aircraft have
had a thorough RCM analysis applied to their respective
maintenance programs. The S-3A is included in this group.
16
E. PHILOSOPHY OF RCM
Before discussing the goals of RCM, it is important to
understand the philosophy that the authors of Reference 1
presented in discussing the relationship between safety and
scheduled maintenance. Their statements concerning this
philosophy are summarized as follows (Ref 1: p. 388):
- Failures are inevitable in complex equipment and can
never be entirely prevented by scheduled maintenance.
- It is possible to design equipment so that very few of its
failures or failure modes will be critical.
- Scheduled overhaul has little or no effect on the
reliability of complex items. Rework tasks directed at
specific failure modes can reduce the frequency of
failures resulting from those failure modes, but the
residual failure rate will still represent an
unacceptable risk. Consequently scheduled rework
is not effective protection against critical failures.
- The techniques of RCM analysis explicitly identify
those scheduled tasks which are essential either to
prevent critical failures or to protect against the
possible consequences of a hidden failure.
- Scheduled maintenance tasks that do not relate to
critical failures have no impact on operating safety.
They do have an impact on operating costs, and their
effectiveness must therefore be evaluated entirely in
economic terms.
F. MIL-STD-2173 (AS) RCM PROCESS OVERVIEW
As now defined by DOD, RCM is a disciplined logic or
methodology used to identify preventive maintenance tasks to
increase inherent reliability of equipment at least
expenditure of resources. MIL-STD-2173 (Ref 7) provides the
procedures by which the Navy can use in applying this
philoshopy to Naval aircraft. The following excerpts from
17
MIL-STD-2173 are intended to provide the reader with a basic
understanding of the RCM analysis program. The goal of RCM
is to provide the following:
a. Analyze the maintenance requirements for each
type/model aircraft;
b. Objectively justify every maintenance requirement;
c. Enforce the performance of only the justified
maintenance actions.
Figure 2 (Ref 9, MOD 4/6) illustrates the process of
reliability centered maintenance. Although each element of
the RCM process will be discussed in greater detail, a
general overview of the process is warranted. Initially,
each system must be categorized as either significant or
non-significant. Significant items then undergo the RCM
decision analysis with preventive maintenance requirements
being assigned to each justifiable task. Once these
requirements are determined, operating experience will
either confirm or deny the maintenance task's effectiveness.
If there was no past historical data from which to base
the decision logic and task selection or if a problem is
identified through actual fleet experience, age exploration
provides a methodology to gain additional information in
determining changes to maintenance requirements. The
outcome of the RCM analysis is either the redesign of the
component, an adjustment in existing maintenance intervals,
the identification of preventive requirements to monitor the


































Figure 2. RCM Process Overview
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task. The ultimate goal is to provide a set of fully
justified maintenance tasks without wasting vital resources.
G. RCM ELEMENTS
To better understand the details of the RCM process.
Figure 3 (Ref 9, MOD 4/7) identifies the major elements.
1. g jgnif icant item gel ect ion
The RCM process starts with the determination of the
design characteristics, functional breakdown, significant
item selection and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
.
Before the analysis can begin, functional
relationships between each item must be examined to determine
the lowest level of item indenture. This relationship
resembles a pyramid with the overall system at the apex.
Figure 4 (Ref 7;pp 19) is an example of this structural
breakdown by level of indenture. Functional breakdown is
concerned with applying the RCM logic to the lowest level of
indenture possible. Once this level is determined, an item
must be classified as either significant or non-significant.
There are two types of significant items, functionally
significant items (FSI) and structurally significant items
(SSI) . A FSI is defined as an item whose loss of function
would have significant consequences at the equipment level. A
SSI is the specific region or element of structure whose
failure would result in a major reduction in residual strength
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Figure 4. RCM Functional Breakdown
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It is important to identify these significant items
as early as possible in the acquisition cycle. Figure 5 (Ref
1, p. 18) provides a decision logic to identify an item as a
FSI, SSI or non-significant.
2. FMEA
The objective of failure mode and effects analysis
is to identify functions, functional failures and
engineering failure modes, and the effects of failure for
each significant item. An example can best describe what
these terms mean. A typical hydraulic pump will be used to
illustrate.
-Function: Provide hydraulic fluid at a fixed pressure
and flow rate;
-Functional Failure Mode: Fails to provide hydraulic
pressure;
-Engineering Failure Mode: Broken shaft;
-Failure Effects: 1.) Loss of hydraulic pump function;
2.) Loss of hydraulic system;
3.) Loss of flight control system and
aircraft capability to safely fly.
It is essential to the RCM analysis process that
FMEA is properly performed since it is a primary input into
the overall task development. MIL-STD-1629A (Ref 10)
provides guidance for documenting the FMEA analysis as an
input to the RCM process.
3. BCM Analysis Decision Logic
After the item is identified as either a FSI or SSI,






























Figure 5. FSI/SSI Selection Diagram
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each failure could have upon the system and what task would
be most effective in preventing the failure. It is important
to note the difference between effects and consequences.
Failure effects are the ways in which a malfunction is
characterized. The consequence is the final outcome or
result of the failure effect. Figure 6 (Ref 7:p. 22) is the
decision logic diagram for determining failure consequences
and selecting the most appropriate maintenance task for
FSI's. There are four failure consequence catagories.
a. Safety consequence;
b. Economic/Operation consequences;
c. Non-safety hidden failure consequences;
d. Safety-Hidden failure consequences.
After the failure consequences are identified, a
preventive maintenance task analysis is conducted to
determine that action which could best prevent the failure
mode. There are five kinds of actions:
a. Servicing and lubrication;
b. On condition: Inspections of the aircraft at either the
organizational, intermediate or depot
level to detect failures before they can
cause a functional failure;
c. Hard-time: Certain items are removed long before they
are expected to fail and are either
discarded or reworked;
d. Combination: Used where an "on-condition" or "hard-
time" action alone proves not to be
applicable or effective;
e. Failure Finding: To find hidden failures when other PM
actions are not applicable or effective
25
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Figure 7 (Ref 7:p. 23) illustrates the decision
logic used for SSI's. Because the failure of a structurally
significant item is always safety critical, a different
logic is utilized in the decision process. This logic
identifies requirements based on whether the design
characteristic is safe life or damage tolerant.
In the safe life structural members there are two
ways to achieve the required level of safety. One is by
ensuring that the member has a large margin of strength over
its expected load carrying requirement. The other is by
limiting the actual time before removal to a value below the
expected life that was determined under laboratory stress
tests.
The damage tolerant design requires that when one or
more elements fail the rest of the structure must be able to
carry the load. Furthermore, the rate at which a fatigue
crack grows should be slow enough to allow time for its
detection before a critical crack length is reached.
4. Age Exploration
Age Exploration is an intergral part of the RCM
analysis process. It provides an effective means by which
to further analyze those components having insufficient data
from which to base a decision. Under most circumstances,
the logic diagrams for the FSI and SSI selection provide a
clear path to follow. However, during the RCM analysis,






























































Figure 7. Decision Diagram for SSI'S
substantuate the conclusion. When a "yes" or "no" answer
can not be easily given, a default logic chart. Figure 8
(Ref 7:p. 24), is used to clarify and provide guidance in
selecting the proper course of action. Whenever default
logic is utilized, the age exploration program described in
NAVAIR 00-25-403 (Ref 11) is useful for determining if an
item should be classified as significant.
Age exploration provides a methodology for
gathering data that is needed to refine and revise initial
maintenance tasks once an aircraft becomes operational. If
age exploration is not utilized effectively, excessive
maintenance costs could mount from inspections that are not
warranted. An age exploration program requires the
following steps:
a. Select candidates for AE by the RCM decision logic;
b. Collection of required data from tasks;
c. Conduct data analysis and obtain results;
d. Apply analysis results to PM task.
Age exploration involves specifying the actual criterion to
be evaluated and the intervals for the sampling inspection.
Careful consideration must be given, however, to ensure
that the potential benefits of age exploration outweigh the
costs of performing such an investigation.
29
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Figure 8. Default Diagram Logic Chart
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H . SUMMARY
MSG-1 was originally developed so that the designer
would be aware of the life cycle costs associated with
maintenance and failure consequences. By being made aware of
these downstream cost im.plications, the designer could make
changes in the design characteristics in the early stages
when changes are easiest and inexpensive. MSG-2 helped
increase reliability and safety while reducing costs
associated with maintainability. Both MSG-1 and MSG-2
provided a realistic approach in determining the tradeoffs
between the safety and economic impacts of design
alternatives.
MSG-3 provided the Reliability Centered Maintenance
concept which further refined the approach of MSG-2 and
added greatly improved analysis procedures. It also
established guidance for determining those maintenance tasks
that would realize the best improvement in reliability at
least expenditure of resources.
The next chapter will discuss the logic of MSG-2 and how
it was applied to the S-3 aircraft in determining the
maintenance requirements and inspection interval
formulation.
31
III. £r3 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
To establish the criteria by which the S-3A's
maintenance program was developed, a discussion of the MSG-2
logic and Analytical Maintenance Program follows. The
purpose of this discussion will be to identify the
differences between MSG-2 and MSG-3 philosophy and how the
S-3A might benefit from the RCM program.
B. ANALYTICAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (MSG-2)
The Department of Defense contracted with United
Airlines in 1972 to apply MSG-2 logic to all Naval aircraft
including the S-3A aircraft. In 1978 the MSG-2 logic logic
was incorporated into a Naval Air publication 00-25-400
entitled: Analytical Maintenance Pcogram Guide foe the
Application ^ Reliability Centered Maintenance for Naval
Aircraft (Ref 5) . Along with MSG-2 philosophy, many other
programs were incorporated into the Analytical Maintenance
Program (AMP). These programs included:
a. The Engineering Cognizance Program
b. Analytical Maintenance Program Analysis Support (AMPAS)
System
c. Aeronautical Analytical Rework Program (AARP)
d. S-3 Aircraft Advanced Maintenance Program
e. Phased Maintenance Program
32
f. Hourly Engine Maintenance Program
g. Maintenance Plan Program
The Analytical Maintenance Program was established for
essentially the same reason that persuaded the airline
industry: to operate a piece of equipment with a
certain probability of success at the lowest possible
cost over the entire life cycle of operation.
There were three phases to the AMP: Analysis,
Implementation and Sustaining. The analysis phase applied
the MSG-2 logic to each significant item and identified
one of three maintenance categories that provided the best
solution. They were hard time, on condition and
condition monitoring tasks. A brief discussion of each
category follows:
a. Hard-Time (HT) Limit - This established a maximum
interval for service life of a particular component due
to the inability to ascertain degradation of
reliability by on-aircraft inspection, testing or
measurement.
b. On-Condition (OC) - To determine the condition of a
particular item, repetitive inspections or tests are
performed to insure a valid "condition standard".
c. Condition Monitoring (CM) - A maintenance process for
items that have no high time limits or on condition
maintenance tasks as their primary maintenance process.
Condition monitoring relies on analysis of item
performance records and involves no hands on scheduled
maintenance.
In the implementation phase, maintenance categories and
requirements were established and culminated with the actual
operating documents. The sustaining phase incorporated data
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and analysis provided by the program to revise existing
maintenance requirements. Only the analysis phase and the
sustaining phase will be discussed to illustrate the MSG-2
criteria under which the S-3 maintenance plan was developed.
C. ANALYSIS PHASE
The main objective of MSG-2 was to establish complete
justification for all scheduled maintenance requirements
(Ref 5: p. 1-2). An initial list of potential significant
item candidates for analysis was developed by reviewing
maintenance instruction manuals, work unit code (WUC)
manuals and aircraft system/components by functional
hardware breakdown. MSG-2 identified two types of
significant items. The first was a maintenance
significant item (MSI) which included all systems,
subsystems and components of the aircraft/equipment, but
excluded fixed airframe structure and the basic
aircraft powerplant. An MSI was the forerunner to the
Functionally Significant Item (FSI) described in Chapter II.
An MSI was an item judged by the analyst to be important
from a failure consequence or failure frequency viewpoint
which could possibly benefit from scheduled maintenance
(Ref 5: Glossary p. 1). The second was a structurally
significant item and was defined as an area of the
primary structure which was judged by the analyst to be
the most important from a fatigue or corrosion vulnerability
standpoint (Ref 5: p. 3-21).
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other problem areas having been identified through
airframe bulletins, technical directives and 3M data were
also considered.
Once all the review was completed, it was the
analyst's decision as to which items were to be designiated
as maintenance significant items (MSI) or structurally
significant items (SSI). This was mostly a subjective
evaluation with the analyst reviewing each system and
component from a hardware standpoint and assessing its
importance to the aircraft integrity.
1. MPA-1 Worksheet (Significant Item Selection)
Once the review of these two critical elements was
complete, the candidate MSI's and SSI's were recorded on
MPA-1 (maintenance plan analysis) worksheet in preparation
for further analysis. Figure 9 (Ref 5:p. A-19) is an
example of the MPA-1 worksheet. This is the starting point
for subsequent analysis steps/worksheets which result in the
final determination of actions required to alleviate
potential failures for each MSI/SSI undergoing analysis.
Each column of the worksheet was then annotated with the
following information.
a. WDC - The appropriate work unit code was entered here.
The WUC identified, numerically, a specific




MPA 1 sheet 1 ol J_
l-l.t P.-li^M) Hr fjA tf Mt viSKjN no DAI E APPLICATION t'REPAHINO ACTIVITV
J i. Ervin
Code 41 2d
1 FpI) 1978 S 3A Aircraft NALC 412D
1 n '." HAH 1 t ^. .IIM> SLHtOULfD VlAlNIENANCfc IMSP PROB
'J<)MtfJ( LArilHf- MIf.-Hf WS'
i'. 1 if~
liF'lLilHtMENtS .BRIEF fREQ SOURCE DISPOSITION HEF
AHHESTING HOOK 1200302 101 TBE Zonal Inspeciion |08.03| PH CFA Delete MPA 2 3
SUPPORT Led HdiicJ (3401
1200302 102 Zonal Inspection (08 03, 22.09) PH CFA Delete MPA23
Riqht Hand (6801
Lubricate Pivot Point 108 031 OS
(281
CFA No action MPA 2 4
Visual Insoection for Evidence DS CFA No action MPA 2 3
ol Corrosion 108 03) 1661
Measure Lug Bushing Inside DLM Add MPA2 3
Diameter (or Wear (20%)
Penetrant Inspection for Cracks DLM Ad'l MPA 2 3
in Lug Fillet Area I20''i)
Visual Inspection for Fastener PH Add MPA23
Condition (340)
Figure 9. MPA-1 Worksheet
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b. Existing/Scheduled Maintenance Requirements - The
existing requirements were usually obtained from one
of the following publications:
1. Periodic Maintenance Information Cards
2. Turnaround Checklists




6. Depot Level Maintenance (DLM) Specifications
c. Inspection Frequency - This interval between inspections
was determined by engineers without any consideration
of the economic consequences of failure. A code such
as PREF for preflight, PF for postflight and D for
daily were some of the codes utilized,
d. Problem Source - Either CFA (Cognizant Field Authority)
or ECA (Equipment Condition Analysis) was entered in
this column. If the program was identified through
data collected by one of the four ECA reports, ECA
was selected. CFA was chosen if the cognizant
field authority decided that a problem item, not
previously identified through ECA, was a candidate
for further analysis.
e. Disposition - This category concerned the final outcome
of the decision process. It could only be answered
after the remaining worksheets which considered
failure modes and effects analysis, scheduled
maintenance requirements and performance of
maintenance requirements, were complete. Five
alternatives were available:
1. "Retain" the required maintenance process;
2. "Delete" or change the primary maintenance
process from hard-time (HT) to condition monitoring
(CM) or on-condition (OC) to (CM)
;
3. "Add" a primary maintenance process such as (OC) or
(HT) ;
4. "Modify" the frequency of maintenance process but
maintain the same category. Only the frequency in
the (OC) task is changed or the criterion for
removal of a (HT) item is altered;
5. "Problem Item" is defined as an item where a hidden
function exists and no valid/effective maintenance
requirements are possible; or a failure would have
a direct adverse effect on operational safety.
Such a disposition would require a redesign to try
to eliminate the hidden function by either visible
access or additional warning instrumentation.
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f. Reference - This column identified the data analysis
worksheet that documented that type of disposition.
2. MEA 2-lA (gt ructuce Significant Item Analysis)
For each SSI identified by the analyst. Figure 10
(Ref 5:p. A-20) provided the necessary documentation for the
structural analysis. A rating system was applied by the
analyst and engineer to obtain a numerical value for
structural criticality. Figure 11 (Ref 5:p. A-22) was the
analysis rating sheet that was utilized by the Naval Air
Rework Facility Alameda, California in determining the
criticality of the SSI.
After compiling the data, an overall criticality
rating was determined by the analyst and represented the
level of structural integrity of the SSI. In most cases,
the fatigue or corrosion resistance rating or the lowest
rating in any category determined the overall criticality
rating (Ref 5 :pp.3-29).
Depending on the criticality rating and the SSI's
impact on safety, a structural examination or sampling plan
was developed and proposed by the analyst. Figure 12 (Ref
5 :p. A-21) is an example of the structural
f requenct/sampling table that was applicable to the S-3.
This table provided a basis from which to analyze initial
estimates of sample size and frequency requirements.
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STRUCTURAL SIGNIFICANT ITEM ANALYSIS MPA 2 1A
NOMENCLATURE
ARRESTING HOOK SUPPORT


















DESIGN DESCRIPTION SURFACE TREATMENT 121
a titanium forging (6AL-6V-2SN) annealed comprisad of.
ASSEMBLY
1) a lug for arresting hook attachment
2) a flange for anaching and transmitting loads to the 578 bulkhead (BHO) OVERALL
3) a beam channel acting as the lovver cap for the keelson
The BHO and keelson attaching fasteners are HLT 318 and the skin
fasteners are AD rivets. LH and RH Installations are symmetric about
aircraft centerline.
STRESS DATA
Lug MS. = 39
Attach MS. = 52
LR 24601
2
OPERATING HISTORY OR APPLICABLE DATA CRACKING
No specific info. MEA refea to A-7 experience for arresting gear
components.
FATIGUE DATA







(II For lug the environment is rated 2, for the beam area between FS 551 & 578 the rating is 3
(2) Passivate -*- 306 prime * 310 paint. Skin attachment is fay sealed.
Figure 10. MPA 2-lA Worksheet
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S 3A AIRCRAFT
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CORROSION CRACKING CORROSION CRACKING
1 VES 56 DAY TURNAROUND DLM 100%
1 NO 56 DAY 170 HR DLM 100%
2 YES 56 DAY 170 HR DLM 100%
2 NO 56 DAY 340 HR
DLM
(20%) 20%
3 YES 56 DAY 340 HR
DLM
20%
3 NO 112 DAY 680 HR
DLM 2
120%) 10%
t VES 112 DAY 340 HR
DLM 2
(20:M 10%





Figure 12. S-3A Aircraft Structural Sampling Table
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3. MEA Zul Work sheet (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis)
After MSI/SSI selection was complete, failure mode
and effects analysis (FEMA) for each item was performed by
completing the MPA 2-1 worksheet. Figure 13 (Ref 5: pp.A-
23,24). Failure modes are the specific ways in which an
item can fail and were broken down into two types:
Functional and engineering failure modes. A funtional
failure was defined as the inability of an item to
perform its normal or characteristic actions within
specified limits. An engineering failure is an actual
physical deviation from the design limit (Ref 13:p.5).
Identifying each engineering failure mode that could
apply to given functional failure is quite important in
the analysis process.
The intent of this worksheet was to ensure that only
realistic failure modes are analyzed. The analyst could then
be fairly confident that a maintenance task was not going to
be assigned to a failure mode that would never occur.
4. MPA 2-2 Worksheet (Development af Potentially
Effective Scheduled Maintenance Requicements)
Upon completion of the FEMA analysis for each MSI
and SSI, MPA 2-2, Figure 14 (Ref 5:p. A-25) was used
to recognize all potential maintenance tasks. The decision
to accept or reject these tasks was determined in later
maintenance plan analysis worksheets. The logic provided by
the worksheet helps identify potential tasks that would
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FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
MPA 2 1 she«t 1 of 2
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NALC. Code 412D 1 Feh 1978
REV DATE
I KM utSKjN DESrwiPiioN fuNCIlON:Si A Irtanmm forqinq (6AL 6V 2SNIannealed comprised ot a lug for arresting hook attachment,
a flange for attaching and transmitting loads to the 578 bulkhead (BHO) and a beam channel acting as the lower cap lor the
keelson The BHD and attaching (asteners are HLT 318 and the skin lasteners are AD rivets. Left hand and right hand installation!
are symmetric afiout aircratt centerline The lunctions are (llresists bending loads applied to keelson. (2) transmits arresting loads to
HtOUNDANCItS PHOTECIIVE WAHNIMj UEVICtS FAIL SAFE SYSTEMS
NONE
FAILURE MODES
1. Loss of normal arresting capability
(al Lug Fracture
2. Loss of resistance by lower cap to lateral loads applied
to keelson
lal Web Fracture
3 Loss of lower skin/BHO Attachment
(al Fastener Frattuie.
FAILURE EFFECTS
1. Inability for arreste'l landing. During carrier operations
this would result in probable loss of aircraft.
2. Skin warp and BHO deformation Aircraft could be
safely recovered alter Might.
3. Loss of structural stability and/or continuity Possible
loss of arresting capability During carrier operations
this would result in probable loss ot aircraft.
Figure 13. MPA 2-1 Worksheet
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FAILURE MOOES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
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I If M IJt ->loN UESCHfPfKJN f UNCI ilJN'S
578 BHD and keelson. (3) provides pivot for arresting gear and (41 provides keelson attach to skin and BHD.
REOUNfJANCItS PHOKtIlvE WARNING D6 V ICf S I-AIlSAEE SYSTEMS
FAILURE MODES FAILURE EFFECTS
Figure 13. MPA 2-1 Worsheet (Continued)
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DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
MPA 2 2 sheet 1 o> 1
I ifcM 'j'jf.'tM.L" runt
ARRESTING HOOK SUPPORT
PiRT MJMHER
Lett Hand 1200302 101
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f vf, GIVE fAILUHE MODE AND DEFINE MEANS OF MONIIORING
IS I'ytl'F-JUINt; F AlLUdf
Ui I ( r I ABLE Bv (ir; Ain'KAf I




•t "ES IJVF fAILURE MOPE AND LIST AIL POTENTIAL TASKS THAT WOULD
Ijf 1 ECT IMt'f»;DIN(i fAILURE 'CHECK INSPECT SERVICE EICl
bla. Penetrant inspection for cracks in luq tillet area.
bib. Visual inspection lor corrosion, pay particular attention to lug area.
bic. Measure lug bushing inside diameter for wear.
h2 Intensive visual lor cracks in web area, pay particular attention to fillet radius.
b3 Visual inspection lor fastener condition.
UO( S f.AllUHE VOUE HAVE A





11 'ES L,lvE F-AILURE MODE AND LIST ALL POTENTIAL TASKS REFERRING TO
OPf HATING SAFCTV ITOTAL TIME LIMITS CHECK INSPECT ETC I
da. Penetrant inspection for cracks in lug fillet area.
clb. Visual inspection for corrosion, pay particular attention to lug area.
cic. Measure lug bushing inside diameter for wear.
c3 Visual inspection lor fastener condition.
IS fHE FU'-C'IDfJ HllHiEN f HUM IMF VIEiVPOINI OF
I HE r I IGH r '-HF «V'
d1 No d2. No d3 No d4 No
e IS THERE AN ADVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE
AND RELIABILITY' Yes. hased on contractor dynamic testing
for operationally inducted wear of pivot point with and without
lubrication
If Yt ', LIST .-.11 i" in ^.U.\l I ASKS M( F ERRING 10
HIDDEN FdNI. I ION (.mECK INSPECT ETC;
IF YES POTFNTIAL FOR OC OR HT MAINTENANCE TASK
el. Periodic lubrication of pivot point.
Figure 14. MPA 2-2 Worksheet
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detect impending failure. Consideration was also given to
the method of failure detection and if the failure had a
direct adverse effect on operational safety.
5. MEA 1=3 WOCKsheet (Definition af scheduled Maintenance
Requirements which Must hs. Performed)
Figure 15 (Ref 5: pp.A-26,27) was used to specify
those maintenance requirements that were essential in
promoting operational safety and reducing the possibility of
hidden functional failures. Failures that were identified
on the MPA 2-2 worksheet as having a direct adverse effect
on safety were analyzed and further defined. Because a
hidden functional failure is a failure of a component that
is not evident to the operating crew, one of three
alternative tasks are available: an on-condition task, a
high-time removal, or a redesign of the item to eliminate
the hidden characteristics.
To complete this worksheet, contractor
design/failure reports, safety center reports, 3M data and
in house investigations were utilized to effectively answer
the logic sequence. When inspection frequencies were in
question, a threshold sampling program was considered. This
program was intended to recognize potential failures by "on-
condition" inspection of aircraft systems. By repetitive
sampling, the program would determine the condition of the
component and if possible, justify continued operation until
the next sample limit. Sample sizes were determined by
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DEFINITION OF SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS WHICH MUST BE PERFORMED
MPA 2 3 sheet 1 of 2
I ft M NUMtNCLAIUHE
ARRESTING HOOK SUPPORT
PART NUMBEfl
Left Hand 1200302 101





I •VMICH Of TH6 lASKiSI REFERRING TO OPERATING SAFETY VUST BE DONE> AT LEAST




cla Penetrant inspection (or crricks in luq lillet area Contractor fatigue tesfinrj has inifiiated a
need to check (or cracks in this area (refer to attached report =LH 23 14). Inspect at <li*pot at
DLM 20;'u Ireler to attached structural sampling table).
clfi. Visual insfjection (or corrosion m lug area. The lug area is easily accessible and cn"Osion
on similar aircraft (refer to attached UR s) has t>een a problem. Inspect at organizational level
ewery 65 days (reler to attached structural sampling tables).
clc. Measure lug bushing inside diameter (or wear. In instances involving like aircrait nfler to
attached UR'sl. ii was deieriniiiL-d that worn lug bushings had contributed to lug fractme Inspect




II A DOES LOSS OF FUNCTION AFFECT TRevv Survivability emergency systems ORESSt\
riAL f LICiHT f UNCTIONS' IF YES CONTINUE \MTH QUESTION II B IF NO CONTINUE ON MPA .' *
Question d generates "NO" answers lor all (unctions, see MPA 2 2.
WHir.H OF THE TASKIS) REFERRING T(J MIOOEN FUNCHONISl MUST BE DONE' AT LEAST
ONE HI OR OC TASK MUST RF TjONE INCl UUE RATIONALE FUH DECISION
Figure 15. MPA 2-3 Worksheet
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DEFINITION OF SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS WHICH MUST BE PERFORMED
MPA 2 3 sheet 2 o( 2
ARRESTING HOOK SUPPORT
PART NUMBER
Lett Hand 1200302 101
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c3 Vnudl insp«ciion lor tasipnpr condition In six instances (live 151 on the A-7 aircraft, one 111 on
the S 3A) visual inspections have Oiscovered early stayes o( corrosion and cracKs. The visual inspection
requires very little lime an<) is easily accomplished. Inspect at organisational level at every 400 lliqht hours.
II A DUES LOSS OF FUNCTION AFFECT CBFl% SURVIVABILITY EMERGENCY SYSTE^'lS OH f SSE N
TIAl FLIbMT FUNCI IONS' IF YtS CONTINUE WITH QUESTION II 8 IF NO CONTINUE ON MPA 2 4
IIH WMM.HOr IHf lASK'Si H K( (i H 1 r.O loMIOUtNfllNcnONIM MUSI BE OONE' AT LEAST
ONE MI OR OC TASK MUSI 8t DUNE INCLUDE RATIONALE FOR DECISION
Figure 15. MPA 2-3 Worksheet (Continued)
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inspecting systems as they became available through routine
service and actual system failure. Additional inspections
were specifically tasked if supplemental information was
required to justify maintenance task revision. It was the
analyst's responsibility to gather data from existing
sources in order to: (Ref 5: p. 3-51)
a. Define the condition of a system at a particular
inspection;
b. Consider granting an interval extension or require
additional samples to be obtained based on reports of
favorable condition at the existing inspection;
c. Recommend design changes if the subsequent inspection
indicates negative results. However, economic
considerations were carefully reviewed before such a
recommendation could occur.
All items that were selected by the analyst as
sampling program candidates were then anotated on the MPA 2-
3 worksheet with supporting rational. Little guidance was
provided as to the criteria by which sample size was
determined or program implementation procedures.
6. MPA 2-4 Wo rksheet (Definition of. scheduled Maintenance
Requirements which Shc>ul<3 h& Performed)
The fifth worksheet was designed to test and
evaluate economic consequences of performing needed
maintenance tasks. The purpose of Figure 16 (Ref 5: pp.A-
28,29) was to justify, economically, if a maintenance task
was warranted for failures that did not effect operational
safety.
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DEFINITIO'-J OF SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE HC OUIHE MENTS WHICH SHOULD BE PERFORMED
MPA 2-4 sfieet _1_o(
_2_
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ARRESTING HOOK SUPPORT
left Hand 1200302 101





A iJOt S Kl At AMU AHf 1 ir AMI ( (JAl A SHOA iMf OtSlMABUM » o» A SCMEDUllD 1 ASK>
DISPOSITION
BflATlvr TO
UPDATE D ANAL ySIS
K vfs list lA'.KS I'i 1 A Uf bCHI''TK)NS lUdC BA1H)\Al( S« i" OUE SI K)N B
II NU INCKJl;! MA MDNALf f OH DlClSIOS' AND GO to UUtSI ION B
bTa Vei Eyalu^tert and acceiUPd on MPA 2 3. task c1»
hib Vei fcvdludtfrt onrt jcceptert on MPA 2 3. laiK cTb.
I)lc Vm Ev<iludi>>r1 jiid dccpoiert on MPA 2 3 tJik cTc
t)2 No Weh tfdctiiie is toicrrfhle does not altect tliyht s;il<'»v The visual exammtion oenerated
by task (3 on MPA 2 3 is arie'iuate to detect wet) Uiiuie The task to conduct a usual
inspection lui Ijstene' condition is theie'ore not economically justilied.




Go to Question B
h Hut S t All uHl ui ilf'.irauSf mission abo«I '
If »(S fVALUAK IA-.H AND INClUOt BAIlONAtC F0« OlClSlO'J
If NO OVII
b2 Ves Evfn inonuh wveh Itacture does not affect (light safety the failii>e may result in skin
wHrp .tnrl HH[) d>-fnrniation If this condition were rtiscovefed pnot to flight it would
possiiiiv result in a mission jbo'i However since task c3 nvill also detect web fracture,
this task h2 is still nut economically lustitied.
Omit
Figure 16. MPA 2-4 Worksheet
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DEFINITION OF SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE PERFORMED
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IF VES LIST TASKS UAI A OtSCHlPnON:S LOGIC RATIONALE SK IP QUEST ION 8
IF NO INCLUDE BAFIONALE FOR UtCISION AND GO TO QUESTION B
el Yes Data on a jimilar aircraft (A 71 tia$ indicated a need to lubricate pivot point This task
IS also justified hy contractor dynamic testing for operationally inducted wear of the
pivot point (Refer to attached manufacturer's report ^LH 235 16.) Lubricate every 30
days at orgam/ationdl level
Include
8 DOES FAiLUBf OF IIFM CAUSE MISSION ABDRf
IF YtS tvALUAlE lASK AND INCLUUE RAIIONALt FOR DECISION
IF NO OMII
Figure 16. MPA 2-4 Worksheet (Continued)
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7. MA 2:z3. Worksheet (Sche<3ule<3 Maintenance Requirements
Q^t^ Sheet
The final worksheet. Figure 17 (Ref 5:p.A-32)
provided the data for each scheduled maintenance action that
was determined to be necessary and cost beneficial. Each
maintenance action was then categorized into particular
areas or zones that would benefit the inspection process.
By dividing the aircraft into inspection zones, the most
efficient schedule was implemented to coordinate all
maintenance actions that pertained to that particular zone.
The analyst, along with engineering experts, determined the
following by zones : (Ref 5: p. 3-53)
a. Phase cycle structure and phase intervals;
b. Depot Level Maintenance (DLM) intervals;
c. Which on-condition and high time requirements could be
grouped into either the phase inspection package or
the DLM inspection process.
These final requirements became part of the overall
maintenance plan and were incorporated into Part III of
NAVAIRINST 4790.4 (Ref 14). A sample of the maintenance
requirements are provided in Figure 18 (Ref 5: pp.A-30,31).
Note that each requirement number corresponded directly to
a specific maintenance requirement that was generated by the
AMP analysis.
Part III of the Maintenance Plan and the MPA 2-5
worksheet provided the information necessary for the
development of the organizational, intermediate and depot
level maintenance publications.
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SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS DATA SHEET
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Figure 17. MPA 2-5 Worksheet
53.
MAINTENANCE PLAN
PART III MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOMENClAIUBfc OESir.NAIION PRtPAHLU BY
J. E. Ervin
DATE APPLICATION wuc
ARRESTING HOOK SUPPORT Code 41 2D 1 Feb 1978 S3A TBE
PARI NUMBfH PREPARING AC1 IVI r V REVISION REVISION DATE
Left Hand 1200302 101
Right Hand 1200302 102 NALC 412D
REQUIREMENT NO REOUIREMENI ',1A1NT^NANCE
LEVfL
INTERVAL I.IIIIUNO SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REQUIHED










3 (bic. del Measure lug bushing
inside diameter tor









Figure 18. Maintenance Plan Worksheet
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D. ANALYTICAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAM SUSTAINING PHASE
The purpose of the analytical maintenance sustaining
phase was to review and update established maintenance
requirements to ensure maximum operational availability and
economic efficiency. The sustaining phase commenced after
the maintenance requirements were initially developed and
continued until the aircraft was retired from service. The
intent of this phase was to refine and continually review
maintenance tasks that were initially developed without
sufficient statistical or failure information. Without some
form of review of these borderline maintenance tasks, an
efficient maintenance program could not exist. Although no
particular program was detailed by the AMP, a general
outline of the process was included. It divided the




Monitoring consisted of first gathering data from all
available resources such as 3M data, sampling programs,
safety center reports, and contractors and engineering
investigations. The next step was to determine what of this
data was the most applicable and would provide meaningful
input into the evaluation process. Once the screened data
indicated a possible candidate for further re-evaluation,
tracking of the item through various methods provided the
basis for the evaluation phase.
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The evaluation process analyzed the specific problem and
identified the major causes. The analyst then decided on
whether or not analytical maintenance program logic should
be applied and what type of corrective action could rectify
this situation. Again, the economic aspects were considered
in deciding if the corrective action should be implemented.
After determining which actions were justified, newly
generated AMP analysis worksheets were originated.
The updating process consisted of implementing those
corrective actions that were the result of the evaluation
process. If changes were required to the scheduled
maintenance program, close liaison with cognizant field
authorities (CFA) , supply centers, training facilities and
Naval Air Systems Command was required to ensure the
changes were implemented in a timely manner.
E. MAJOR DEFICIENCIES IN MSG 2 PHILOSOPHY
Although MSG-2 provided a logical process for analyzing
a particular item in terms of its significance to an
overall system, many areas in the analysis process lacked
specific guidance. Since the S-3's maintenance plan was
developed under the MSG-2 philosophy, it is important to
note these weaknesses that MSG-3 improved.
a. The significant item selection process was not well
defined and could possibly allow identification of an
item that had no significance to the system.
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b. Once the failure mode and effects analysis determined
each- functional failure, no logic was provided to
relate the failure with the task that was most
applicable in ensuring that the failure did not occur.
c. There was no program available to evaluate maintenance
tasks that were established with insufficient data. It
was left up to the analyst to establish procedures that
would enable the task to be re-evaluated using
subsequent historical data.
Many areas of the S-3A's maintenance plan would benefit
from performing a thorough RCM analysis. However, the cost
of such an enormous undertaking would be hard to justify
considering the aircraft's age and current economic funding
constraints. The alternative should be a partial analysis
that would incorporate existing NARF programs with the
current philosophies of Reliability Centered Maintenance.
Two areas that would benefit the most from RCM are SSI re-
evaluation and problem items that have exhibited a higher
than normal failure rate. The next chapter will discuss the
deficiencies of MSG-2 in detail and how RCM can provide
added emphasis to the existing S-3A Analytical Maintenance
Program.
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IV. IMPROVEMENTS FQR TflE S-3A MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
A. RELIABILITY CENTERED MAINTENANCE
Reliability Centered Maintenance is the refined product
of MSG-2 and provides detailed methodology in determining
scheduled maintenance requirements, inspection interval
determination, and age exploration candidates. The logic
and analytical techniques furnished by RCM philosophy,
enable the analyst to formulate consistent and well defined
results. As stated previously, RCM is designed to provide a
disciplined logic or methodology for identifying preventive
maintenance tasks that will realize the inherent reliability
of equipment at least expenditure of resources. To
accomplish this goal, specific maintenance tasks are
identified for each functional failure and, through an
effective age exploration program, operational data is
gathered to insure that a safe and reliable maintenance
program is developed.
As stated in the preceding chapter, one of the programs
that would benefit the most from integrating RCM analytical
techniques is in examining structurally significant items.
NARF Alameda is currently examining its structurally
significant items for the S-3A utilizing a program developed
under the Naval Air System Command's Analytical Maintenance
Program (AMP) . Called the Structural Sampling Program
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(SSP) , it incorporates MSG-2 philosophy and its purpose is
to perform the minimum number of examinations necessary to
assess a change in the material condition of a structurally
significant item. It has as its basis some of the same
analytical design characteristics that were eventually
contained in the Age Exploration Program. The data
generated by the SSP is intended to monitor changes in the
material condition of the SSI, update the maintenance plan,
and identify SSI's that need further analysis (Ref 15:p.
1) . Although the SSP has the potential to become an
integral part of the overall maintenance effort, many areas
of this program could benefit from incorporating RCM
philosophy and refined age exploration techniques.
Items not classified as SSI's but are exhibiting an
excessive failure rate would also benefit from RCM analysis.
These items need a thorough investigation to identify the
proper maintenance tasks for reducing the failure rate.
The areas that will be discussed will emphasize how RCM
can benefit the existing SDLM programs of the S-3A. They
include:
a. Significant Item Selection and Tracking Methodology,
b. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Maintenance Task
Selection and Determination,
c. Age Exploration Program.
MIL-STD-2173 (AS) (Ref 7) provides procedures and
techniques for applying RCM logic to Naval aircraft, weapon
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systems and support equipment. New revised worksheets have
been developed that analyze each maintenace task category
for applicability and effectiveness. Because each worksheet
is discussed in great detail in MIL-STD-2173, it will not be
individually analyzed here. Only the particular elements
that MSG-3 clarified and re-defined will be discussed to
demonstrate the importance of applying the logic to the S-3A
Structural Sampling Program and problem item analysis.
B. SIGNIFICANT ITEM SELECTION AND TRACKING METHODOLOGY
The significant item selection process was discussed in
detail in Chapters II and III. It is important to note that
no decision logic was provided in MSG-2 to assist the
analyst in determining if the item should be classified as
structurally significant, functionally significant or
categorized as non-significant. Since the SSP was developed
utilizing MSG-2 logic, it is possible that elements could be
classified incorrectly or worse, not classified at all.
Since the SSI's that the Structural Sampling Program
examined were not identified using the logic provided by
RCM, it is important that each SSI that the Structural
Sampling Program looks at be verified as being truly
significant to the system. If not, a great deal of wasted
resources will be expended on a task that is not really
necessary.
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The SSP is designed to sample, on a continuing basis,
each SSI. A thorough cross section of statistical data is
derived by utilizing a matrix provided by SSP that
determines sample size and inspection frequencies. The
analytical process of determining sample size and inspection
frequency is similar to that detailed in the Age Exploration
Program. To determine which SSI is to be looked at, the SSP
matrix first identifies the aircraft by bureau number
(BUNO) , determines which standard depot level maintenance
(SDLM) visit the aircraft is scheduled for and finally which
work package must be performed. Each work package contains
certain SSI's that must be looked at and requires the
results to be annotated on the SSI worksheet Figure 19 (Ref
15) . These worksheets are then gathered by the analyst for
further evaluation. However, no method has been derived to
track or analyze the data collected for each SSI. To assist
the analyst in this endeavor, a work sheet. Figure 20, is
provided that will consolidate information pertaining to
each SSI.
By tracking each SSI separately, trends can be readily
identified and appropriate RCM analysis can be initiated.
Not only failure data needs to be collected, SSI's with no
failures also need to be tracked. Part I of the worksheet
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Figure 19. SSI Worksheet
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Not all SSI failures will be detected during the
scheduled SDLM inspection. Failures that occur
operationally will be annotated in Part II of the worksheet.
This will provide a ready reference as to which aircraft
experienced the failure, who initiated the report, the date
of the report and the exact nature of the failure. This
format can be used to track such reports as Engineering
Investigations (EI), safety reports and other maintenance
related messages. The analyst can also adopt this worksheet
to track items that are not identified as significant items
but are experiencing an excessive failure rate.
This tracking of SSP and problem item data is extremely
important for the preventive maintenance program to be
effective. Once the significant items are identified and
trends develop that indicate a problem, RCM can provide an
effective means by which to analyze the component. A full
scale RCM analysis can be performed to verify if the task is
warranted, identify if an inspection interval adjustment is
required, or further data is required for a decision and age
exploration is warranted. The important point is, however,
that the analyst must first be able to identify which items
require further analysis. The data that is currently being
collected for the SSP program is not broken down by specific
SSI. Rather, it has been categorized by which aircraft the
SSI failure occurred on. By tracking each SSI and problem
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item separately, these items will be identified and the
analyst will have a documented trail from which to base his
RCM analysis.
SSI TRACKING WORKSHEET
SSI LINE NUMBER | ITEM NOMENCLATURE
I
wuc PART NUMBER
PERCENT OF AIRCRAFT SAMPLED













DATE SOURCE OF INFO ORIGINATOR
(MESSAGE DTG)
TYPE OF FAILURE
Figure 20. Tracking Analysis Worksheet
C. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AND MAINTENANCE TASK
SELECTION AND DETERMINATION
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) , under MSG-2
guidelines, was intended to isolate each legitimate
functional failure mode and in turn, identify the related
causes. Once these failure modes and effects were
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determined, a maintenance category was selected by the
analyst and engineer that was most appropriate. However, no
clear logical process was provided utilizing MSG-2
guidelines.
MIL-STD-2173 (Ref 7) and MIL-STD-1629 (A) (Ref 10)
provide clarification and guidance in performing a thorough
FMEA and task evaluation. The FMEA analysis identifies the:
a. Equipment Item,
b. Item's functions,
c. Item's functional failures,
d. Engineering failure modes, and
e. Effects of the failures on the system.
Problem items and SSI's that are identified through the
SSP program would require a thorough Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) as part of the RCM evaluation.
Preventive maintenance analysis is then used to determine if
there is some maintenance task which will reduce or prevent
the failures identified from the FMEA. In the past, it was
a judgemental call by the analyst as to which maintenance
category was the most appropriate.
For problem items not defined as an SSI, RCM decision
logic details the process to determine the consequences of
failure for each failure mode and, depending on the
consequence of failure, identifies a particular maintenance
task that would best avoid the failure mode. Instead of
three maintenance task categories that were originally
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identified by MSG-2, RCM identified five separate







For SSI's that have experienced a well defined trend,
either excessive failures or minimal failures, a FMEA is
performed as part of the RCM re-evaluation process. The
logic will then identify the SSI as either damage tolerant
or safe life. Once determined, the decision logic
recommends one of the following alternatives:
a. What task is most applicable;
b. Possible age exploration candidate;
c. Redesign;
d. Reconsider if the item is actually a structurally
significant item.
After each task is determined, it must be evaluated for
applicability and effectiveness. MSG-2 discussed the
importance of determining if the task was both applicable
and effective, but failed to establish a methodology that
would provide acceptable probability of failure levels and
cost effectiveness constraints.
66
RCM logic provides a methodology for determining the
effectiveness of a maintenance task. This logic is
beneficial in determining if a maintenance task that has
been developed for a problem item or SSI is an effective
deterent in preventing the items failure. Without
performing this analysis, a task could be ineffective as
well as uneconomical to perform. The failure consequence
determines what type of analysis is applied to the task.
Effectiveness criteria is established for safety and safety
hidden failure consequences and seperate criterion is
developed for economic/operational and non-safety hidden
failure consequences.
The RCM decision logic that is provided offers the
analyst a clear path from which to base critical decisions
that will eventually determine if the task is justified or
not. By applying this logic to the Structural Sampling
Program and items identified as problem candidates, the
analyst can determine the appropriate course of action that
had previosly been undefined.
D. VERIFICATION OF MAINTENANCE TASKS THROUGH AGE
EXPLORATION
In MSG-2, the sustaining phase of the Analytical
Maintenance Program (AMP) was designed to provide
monitoring, evaluation and updates of assigned maintenance
tasks. It recommended using data gathered from such sources
as 3M, safety center reports, and contractor's engineering
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investigations. However, it failed to provide any specific
procedure for analyzing the data. It also failed to detail
steps for establishing an effective evaluation program.
This is exactly the situation that NARF Alameda finds its
SSP program in. Although data is being gathered on SSI's
and other problem items, they have not established any real
program that analyzes the data.
By integrating RCM and the Age Exploration Program with
current NARF analytical programs, the maintenance program
can be continually reviewed and updated by gathering data
throughout the system's life cycle. The data gathered from
an effective age exploration analysis will either verify the
validity of an existing maintenance task, identify the need
for interval inspection adjustment or determine that
additional age exploration analysis is warranted. The
methodology provided by the Age Exploration Program would be
most beneficial in filling the current void in the
Structural Sampling Program and problem item analysis.
The Naval Aviation Logistics Center has recently
developed a management manual (Ref 11) that details the
requirements for establishing a successful Age Exploration
Program in accordance with MIL-STD-2173 (AS) (Ref 7) . The
methodology provides specific guidance for sample size
determination, sampling interval development and suggests
techniques to be used for analyzing data collected.
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Chapter II stated that all items that use default logic
in task evaluation are an age exploration candidate. Other
items can also be candidates for age exploration. The Age
Exploration Program, (Ref ll:p,26) identifies these as:
a. Items that have been identified as exhibiting poor
reliability, high maintenance costs, low availability
rates or high abort rates.
b. New items that have been added as a result of
modifications or engineering change proposals.
However, before an age exploration task is identified,
the item must first undergo RCM analysis.
c. Items that cause a significant safety hazard.
It is quite clear that this program would be well suited
to fill the void that is hindering the re-evaluation efforts
of maintenance task analysis. By defining such an age
exploration task and monitoring the failure data, specific
knowledge is obtained that will substantiate the need for
maintenance program adjustment.
Although it would be extremely beneficial to perform an
age exploration analysis on every potential candidate, the
economical consequences must be carefully considered.
Figure 21 (Ref 11: p. 30) illustrates the decision process
in determining if an age exploration task is warranted. It
also aids in prioritizing the proposed candidates. By
following the logic, the candidates that are safety critical
and most cost effective are analyzed first. Lower priority
candidates are analyzed only if time and money permit.
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Figure 21. Age Exploration Candidate Task Analysis
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After it is determined which candidates would benefit
the most from an age exploration analysis, a preliminary
task for each candidate must be developed. The task that
will be developed must be able to determine specific age
relationships by providing an analytical process by which to
monitor failure data. In most cases, age exploration is
directed at the failure modes of the components and not at
the overall system. The analyst, when designing the task,
must determine what information is required, how it is going
to be obtained, where it can be obtained, who is going to
obtain it, and what techniques are to be used to analyze the
data (Ref ll:p. 34)
.
The final output of the age exploration process is to
apply the results of the analysis to the preventive
maintenance program. This involves inputing this
information back into the RCM worksheets to determine the
most appropriate maintenance task and inspection interval.
RCM, by utilizing the outputs of age exploration, is able to
adjust maintenance intervals, adjust maintenance tasks, or
modify the design.
E . SUMMARY
Although the basis of the Structural Sampling Program is
somewhat related to the Age Exploration Program, the SSP
fails to incorporate the required methodology that would
enable the analyst to realize the full potential of the
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AE program. It must be realized that RCM in conjunction with
Age Exploration can play a major role in ensuring that an
effective preventive maintenance program is established for
SSI's as well as problem items. By not applying some form
of re-evaluation process, all the program produces is data.
By evaluating each maintenance task and applying the logic
of RCM, an effective maintenance concept is achieved that
can be adjusted as data is gathered through out the life
cycle of the aircraft.
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V. SUMMARY . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The intent of this thesis was to demonstrate how
Reliability Centered Maintenance could enhance and provide
further direction to the existing preventive maintenance
program of the S-3A aircraft. It described in detail the
Analytical Maintenance Program that was the basis for the
current S-3A*s maintenance plan. By examining how the
maintenance plan was derived, deficiencies were identified
in task development and re-evaluation. Removal of these
deficiences by the use of RCM allows the analyst to
concentrate on preventive maintenance tasks that will
increase the inherent reliability of the equipment with the
least expediture of resources.
Significant item selection was not well defined
utilizing MSG-2 philosophy. RCM clarifies significant item
selection and, if the logic does not provide a definitive
answer, default logic is provided to assist the analyst in
SSI selection decisions. All components that are subject to
default logic became age exploration candidates. Age
exploration verifies, through data collection and analysis,
if the maintenance task for the SSI are valid or require
inspection interval adjustment.
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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis provides a clear path
in analyzing each functional failure and determining which
preventive maintenance task would reduce or prevent the
identified failure. Dependent on the failure consequence,
RCM recommends one of five maintenance tasks categories.
After each functional failure has an assigned maintenance
task, the task can be evaluated for applicability and
effectiveness. Economic as well as safety considerations
can be assessed to determine the necessity of establishing a
required maintenance task.
Age Exploration is one of the most important elements of
the RCM program. By establishing an effective age
exploration program, the maintenance program is continually
reviewed by gathering historical data throughout the life
cycle of the aircraft. Specific knowledge is then obtained
that will indicate if a maintenance task adjustment is
warranted.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Naval Air Rework Facility at NAS Alameda could
benefit substantially by incorporating RCM analysis into
existing S-3A preventive maintenance programs. However,
performing a thorough RCM analysis on every S-3A component
and program can not be justified. It is therefore
recommended that RCM be applied selectively to those
components and programs that would benefit the most.
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The Structural Sampling Program and components that are
experiencing excessive failures are two aspects of the
maintenance analysis effort that would profit from
incorporating RCM analysis. NARF Alameda is currently
sampling every structrually significant item through the
Structural Sampling Program, but has not established a
program by which to analyze the data. Likewise, problem
items that are identified "in-house" or through operational
channels have not undergone RCM analysis. Thus, the
following recommendations are provided:
1. SSP must identify through SSI data collection
techniques those items that are experiencing a trend.
Both excessive failures and minimal failures must be
identified.
2. Problem items that are not SSI's, but are experiencing
excessive failures also need to be tracked.
3. Once a trend is identified by the analyst, RCM
techniques must be applied to develop a task that will
rectify the problem. Possible consequences will include
re-defining the task involved, task interval adjustment,
or performing further anlaysis through age exploration.
It is most important, that the analyst realize the
benefits that RCM can provide. Reliability Centered
Maintenance clarifies and broadens the scope of maintenance
task analysis and will add significant improvements to
existing SDLM Analytical Maintenance Programs.
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